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1 Introduction
Sub-central governments enjoy larger degrees of competence in revenue and expenditure deci-
sions, a trend that has been documented empirically (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005). What
are the determinants of this trend? And what are the channels through which decentralization
is achieved? These questions, while on top of the policy agenda, have been relatively little
explored.
In this paper we point to two directions we consider relevant in understanding the mecha-
nisms of delegation of competencies to lower level governments: rst, in many instances there
is joint contribution and shared responsibility in the provision of specic public goods by two
or more levels of government. This implies that we need to adapt our theoretical framework
by moving away from considering decentralization as a binary choice i.e. provision either by
the central or lower level government, as generally assumed in the scal federalism literature
and toward explicitly taking into account the interplay arising from joint provision. Hence,
decentralization is often of partial nature. Second, politics matters: we argue that the degree
of decentralization within a country depends in important ways on the relative political forces
between levels of government.
Most of the theoretical literature in economics treats the decision to decentralize as a binary
one. Based on the Decentralization Theorem(Oates, 1972) allocation of public goods and
services is guided by a trade-o¤between internalizing inter-jurisdictional spillovers and catering
to local preferences.1 Notably, even what is known as the Second Generation Theory of Fiscal
Federalism (Weingast, 2009), while moving away from assuming benevolent governments2 to
include political dimensions, still essentially remains within a binary choice framework.
1See Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a recent survey.
2The standard in the First Generation Theory (Oates, 2003).
Conversely, actual decentralization policies generally imply overlap in spending duties by
two or more levels of government. Breton (1996) argues that few countries do indeed have a
fully centralized government structure. Even unitary states, such as France and Spain, have
lower level authorities, often with elected o¢ cials.
We dene partial decentralization as a situation where a public good is provided by more
than one level of government. Jametti and Joanis (2009a) using raw data from the IMFs Gov-
ernment Financial Statistics show that even within fairly disaggregate spending items, such as
education, health and culture, there is contribution from three levels of government (central,
state and local) in Canada, Switzerland and the U.S. Similarly, within their database, consid-
ering between 40 and 50 countries with at least some (overall) expenditure decentralization
and the aforementioned spending items, only cultural spending in India is fully decentralized.
Partial decentralization gives rise to vertical interactions among governments on two dimen-
sions. First, complementarities in spending among levels of government make joint contribution
socially optimal. Second, vertical externalities arise among politicians as they might benet
and react strategically to the contribution to the public good of another level of government.
The latter dimension is the main focus of this paper, the political economy of partial
decentralization having received relatively little attention in the literature.3 Our analysis is
based on an earlier paper by Joanis (2009), which is cast in the context of a pure moral hazard
political agency model, an approach initiated by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). In the
model, two levels of government are involved in the provision of a public good and voters
are imperfectly informed about each governments contribution to the good, creating a shared
accountability problem. An important feature of the model is that the degree of decentralization
3We are aware of two recent exceptions: Brueckner (2009) studies partial scal decentralization in a Tiebout-
style framework, while Hateld and Padro i Miquels (2008) analysis is cast in a tax competition framework.
Neither of these papers provide an empirical application.
is endogenous in the model and depends on three elements: (i) the relative competence of each
level of government, (ii) the relative rents that politicians at each level of government can earn
from holding o¢ ce, captured in the model by each level of governments access to the tax base,
and (iii) the relative political conditions prevailing at each level of government, i.e. the extent
to which each level of government can a¤ect its electoral fortunes by contributing to the public
good.
This papers focus is on the third of these predictions, with the theorys main insight
being that the central governments electoral strength should, all else being equal, increase
that governments share of spending. Using data from a panel of democracies, we explore the
role of electoral conditions prevailing at the central level on the degree of both expenditure
and revenue centralization. Fixed e¤ects regressions generally support the theory, together
with highlighting the non-linear nature of the empirical relationship between centralization
and government strength. Overall, these results show that electoral variables rightly belong in
the set of determinants of scal decentralization.
The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief discussion of the related empirical literature
in Section 2, Section 3 lays down the theoretical model and derives empirically-testable pre-
dictions. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy and describes the data, with empirical
results being presented in Section 5. The last section concludes briey.
2 Contribution to the Literature
This paper is related to the large body of empirical research investigating decentralization as
a determinant of various economic variables, where decentralization is measured in terms of a
revenue or expenditure ratio between di¤erent levels of government, e.g. sub-federal divided
by total government expenditures. For example, Oates (1985) relates the size of government to
the degree of decentralization, a question that has been taken up by a number of studies (for a
survey, see Feld et al., 2003). Thus, decentralization often features as an explanatory variable
in empirical research on scal federalism.
Much smaller but closer to our purpose  is the empirical literature on the actual de-
terminants of scal decentralization. An early, cross-sectional attempt is Panizza (1999), who
nds that country size, income, ethnic fractionalization and the degree of democracy all reduce
the degree of scal decentralization. Similar results are presented by Arzaghi and Henderson
(2005), using panel data. A more recent study, also in a panel context, on the determinants
of decentralization in Switzerland (Feld et al., 2008) shows that centralization is negatively
related to the availability of direct democratic decision-making (referenda). Stegarescu (2009)
documents the role of political integration as a determinant of scal decentralization in OECD
countries.
We expand the existing literature on the determinants of scal decentralization along three
dimensions: First, as mentioned above, in most of the theoretical literature, the devolution
of public good provision and nancing is assumed to be a binary decision, e.g. expenditures
are either provided by the central or the local government. Second, political economy aspects
of decentralization are generally introduced in an ad hoc way in the empirical analysis.4 Our
analysis is based on a theoretical political economy framework, thus introducing explicitly the
e¤ects of political choices on the degree of decentralization. Third, we see a better modeling
of the determinants of decentralization as a stepping stone towards addressing the issues that
arise in models where decentralization is used as an explanatory variable such as the Oates
regressions from above which su¤er quite obviously from endogeneity problems. In particular,
4Panizza (1999) does present a theoretical model in which the degree of centralization is endogenously de-
termined. However, that model does not focus on political aspects.
the potential for endogeneity problems is evident in the theoretical model presented in the next
section, in which the degree of decentralization is an equilibrium outcome. Our work can be seen
as an exploration of potential instruments for decentralization variables in other applications.
3 A Model of Shared Responsibility in a Federation
This section lays down a model in which a public good valued by the voters in a given juris-
diction is jointly provided by two levels of government (labelled federaland provincial). It
describes the environment (composed of two governments and N identical voters), characterizes
the social optimum, and derives key results on the political determinants of decentralization.5
In each of two periods, two levels of government choose scal policy (taxes collected and
spending) to maximize their expected level of rent extraction, subject to the constraint that
they need to seek reelection at the end of the rst period. Voters, who value public goods, can
observe total taxes and can infer total rents. However, they do not observe the intergovernmen-
tal composition of expenditures. Public good provision is positively related to the reelection
probability of both governments such that the spending decisions of one level of government
a¤ects not only its own reelection probability but that of the other level of government as
well (a positive externality arises). Each level of governments equilibrium contribution to the
public good equates its own marginal benet from reelection with an incentive to free-ride
on the other level of governments contribution to the marginal cost of foregone rents in the
rst period, taking as given the strategy of the other level of government.
5This section is adapted from Joanis (2009).
3.1 The Environment
Every period, the federal government (indexed by superscript f) and the provincial government
(indexed by superscript p) each contribute to the provision of a public good g in a province.
Government j produces gj  0 units of a publicly-provided input. Together, the federal and
provincial inputs are converted into a public good g by a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) technology:6
g =

f (gf ) + p(gp)
1=
; (1)
where   1: p and f are parameters that denote each level of governments competence.
Each government levies a lump-sum tax (T j) and faces a common unit cost of produc-
tion (~). Politicians in o¢ ce can divert tax revenues away from public good provision and
towards their own benet. Assuming balanced budgets at each level of government, any of the
jurisdictions N individuals faces a total tax bill of
T = T f + T p = (gf + gp) + sf + sp; (2)
where  = ~=N and sj are the per capita rents extracted by government j.
All individuals have the following quasi-linear utility function:
u(g; z) = h(g) + z; (3)
where z denotes the consumption of a private good and h is a well-behaved concave function.
6Nishimura (2006) also uses such an aggregation technology in a similar context.
For tractability, let us assume a simple functional form for h :
h(g) = g; (4)
where 0 <  < 1. Furthermore, every period each individual is endowed with y units of the
private good such that
z + T = y: (5)
Without loss of generality, we normalize the population of the jurisdiction to unity (N = 1)
since all individuals are identical.
For simplicity, let us make a few additional assumptions about taxes. Since taxes are lump-
sum in this model, we can assume that individuals and governments take total taxes collected
(T p and T f ) as given. Let us further assume that T p and T f are xed at some pre-determined
levels that are su¢ cient for each level of government to provide some arbitrary maximum
level of the public good (g). In sum, we assume the following series of inequalities for each
government j:
g  T j  y: (6)
3.2 Benevolent Governments and the Optimal Degree of Decentralization
Given our focus on the extent of decentralization on the expenditure side, for expositional
purposes, it will be useful to dene the degree of decentralization(d) as the share of provincial
spending in total spending:
d  g
p
gf + gp
2 [0; 1]: (7)
The case in which d = 1 will be referred to as complete decentralization, d = 0 as complete
centralization, and 0 < d < 1 will correspond to instances of partial decentralization.
Optimality requires that politicians extract no rents while in o¢ ce (sfS = spS = 0) and
that the Samuelson condition be satised (a superscript S denotes the social optimum). In
this model, the latter implies that government j contributes to the public good according to
the following expression:
gjS =
 

 1
 1
(j)
1
1 

(j)
1
1  + ( j)
1
1 
  
( 1)
if  < 1; (8)
where  j denotes the other level of government. It follows from (8) that the optimal spending
ratio (which determines the optimal degree of decentralization) is a function of the relative
competence of the two levels of government:

gp
gf
S
=

p
f
 1
1 
: (9)
If the inputs produced by both levels of government do not exhibit any complementarity ( = 1)
a case in which these inputs are perfect substitutesthe socially optimal levels of gf and
gp are given by the following conditions:
gjS =




1
j
 1 1
if j >  j ;
gp + gf =
 


 
1

 1 1 if p = f = ; for some ;
gjS = 0 if j <  j :
(10)
The above results are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Decentralization) The involvement of both levels of government
in the provision of a public good i.e. partial decentralizationis optimal provided that there
is some degree of complementarity between gf and gp: Complete centralization can be optimal
only if there is no complementarity in gf and gp ( = 1) and if the federal government is more
competent than the provincial government (f  p). Similarly, complete decentralization is
optimal only if  = 1 and f  p:
In what follows, we assume that  < 1.
3.3 Introducing Politics: Opportunistic Politicians and Strategic Voters
Unless governments are assumed to be benevolent social planners, their behaviour depends on
the incentives provided by the political process. This paper considers a two-period model, with
separate elections taking place at the provincial and federal levels between the two periods. As
in Besley and Smarts (2006, 2007) political agency model, elections in our model can act as
an imperfect disciplinary device.
Politicians Each government maximizes expected discounted rents (per capita) over the two
periods, given by
Sj = sj1 + P
jsj2; (11)
where subscripts indicate periods,  2 [0; 1] is a discount factor and P j is incumbent js
perception of his reelection probability.
Voters and elections Voters face a simple binary reelection decision in the elections held
at the two levels of government at the end of period 1. The two elections are assumed to take
place simultaneously.7 Furthermore, following Besley and Smart (2006), voters are taken to be
able to announce and commit to a reelection rule before the elections take place.
Information The information available to voters at election time is crucial to the ability of
elections to act as disciplinary devices. Two sources of imperfect information will be crucial to
the analysis that follows:
1. Voters do not observe the contribution of each level of government to the shared public
good. However, voters observe the aggregate level of the public good. In other words,
voters observe g but not gf and gp.
2. Uncertainty about the election outcome is introduced and resolved only after incumbents
have taken all relevant decisions and just before the voters cast their ballots. From the
point of view of incumbents, elections are probabilistic.
In the spirit of probabilistic voting models, such as those developed by Persson and Tabellini
(2000) or more recently by Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008), election results are typically
uncertain from the point of view of politicians (at least to some extent) since a series of shocks
may a¤ect the electorates decision beyond scal policy (e.g. other issues arising during the
campaign, characteristics of challengers, partisan loyalty). Here, these shocks are specic to
a given level of government, introducing heterogeneity in the electoral conditions between the
elections taking place at the two levels of government.
Timing The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Incumbents set period-1 scal policy (determining the contribution to the shared public
good and the level of rents);
7A case in which this assumption is relaxed is presented in Joanis (2009).
2. Voters observe the realization of two random variables which summarize the electoral
conditions specic to each election;
3. The federal and provincial elections take place; and
4. If reelected, the incumbents set period-2 scal policy. Otherwise, voters achieve the utility
level associated with challengers (similar in all respects to incumbents).
3.4 Equilibrium and predictions
Voters announce that they will reelect each incumbent if their period-1 utility level exceeds
some random threshold value,8 the distribution of which is assumed to be common knowledge.
The cut-o¤ utility level relevant to the provincial election is denoted u and is a random variable
distributed according to F; a c.d.f. Hence, voters reelect the provincial government if
u(g; T )  u: (12)
Symmetrically, they reelect the federal government is their utility exceeds the realization of a
random variable v; distributed according to G; a c.d.f.
From the point of view of incumbents, reelection is probabilistic. Electoral results depend
on aggregate public good provision and on the realization of the stochastic reservation utility
levels. The probability that the provincial incumbent is reelected is
P p = Pr [u(g; T )  u] = F [u(g; T )] : (13)
For simplicity, let us assume that u is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; u], implying
8One interpretation for this is that information about the quality of the challengers becomes available just
before the election.
that
P p =
1
u
u(g; T ): (14)
Note that the reelection probability is decreasing in u, the upper bound on the random cut-o¤
utility level. Hence, the election is riskier from the incumbents point of view the higher is this
upper bound.
We can now consider the provincial incumbents problem in period 1:
max
gp
T p   gp + T p 1
u

(f (gf ) + p(gp))=   T p   T f

; (15)
which is obtained by substituting the governments budget constraint (gp + sp = T p) and
equation (14) in equation (11).9 The federal government solves a symmetric problem, with
v  U [0; v] : The two levels of government are assumed to behave non-cooperatively in setting
their contribution to the public good, taking the contribution level of the other government as
given. Since elections are simultaneous, the equilibrium contribution levels in period 1 will be
those observed in a Nash equilibrium.
Under shared responsibility, the degree of decentralization is endogenous and is the outcome
of vertical interactions between the two levels of government that are shaped by the degree of
substitutability between the public inputs.10 The reaction functions are given by:
T p
u
(f (gf ) + p(gp))


 1
(gp) 1p =


; (16)
T f
v
(f (gf ) + p(gp))


 1
(gf ) 1f =


: (17)
9Time subscripts are dropped from now on since the period-2 problem is trivial, with maximum rents being
taken by each government. All decision variables relate to period 1.
10Whereas high complementarity mitigates the ability of each government to merely free-ride on the others
contribution, complementarity is also associated with a more indirect e¤ect of aggregate spending on reelection
probabilities.
Solving (16) for an interior solution yields the Nash equilibrium spending ratio:
gp
gf
=

p
f
T p
T f
v
u
 1
1 
; (18)
which in general is di¤erent from the optimal spending ratio given by equation (9), unless
T pv = T fu:
Proposition 2 (Endogenous decentralization) The equilibrium degree of decentralization
corresponds to the optimal degree of decentralization only if T
p
T f
= u

v ; i.e. if the provincial-federal
revenue ratio is equal to the provincial-federal ratio of the voters reservation utility levels.
Otherwise, the equilibrium spending ratio di¤ers from the optimal ratio and is determined by
the product of three ratios: the relative competencies

p
f

, the revenue ratio
 
T p
T f

, and the
relative reelection uncertainties
 
v
u

.
Hence, a decentralization reform that leads to de facto shared expenditure responsibilities
may not be socially optimal despite the existence of complementarities amongst levels of gov-
ernment. The key reasons for why this is the case in this model are (i) votersinability to hold
each level of government individually liable for its actions, and (ii) vertical interactions among
levels of government, which take into account factors other than relative competencies.
The theoretical model thus leads to the following empirically-relevant equation:
gp
gf
= f

p
f
;
T p
T f
;
v
u

+ "; (19)
where " is an error term. In the remainder of this paper, we develop an empirical implemen-
tation of this equation. Our main endeavour is to identify the e¤ect of electoral conditions on
the observed degree of decentralization.
4 Empirical Framework and Data
Equation (18) implies a relationship between the degree of expenditure decentralization and
three ratios:
1. Relative competencies: This ratio captures a technological advantage of one level of
government over the other. For example, in the spirit of Oates decentralization the-
orem, if f < p; that is the level of government closest to citizens has an advantage
in production, equilibrium (and optimal) expenditure decentralization will favour the
provincial government. While this ratio is interesting in its own right, we will assume in
the following empirical application that it does not vary within country over time. As a
consequence, its e¤ect will be captured by the country xed e¤ects.
2. Revenue ratio: Not surprisingly, the model predicts that expenditure decentralization
is closely related to how the tax base is split between the two levels of government. To
avoid obvious endogeneity issues in including the revenue ratio among our right-hand side
variables, our preferred empirical specications will exclude the revenue ratio. However,
revenue decentralization is interesting in its own right, and we investigate its determinants
in the next section.
3. Relative reelection uncertainties: This is our main ratio of interest. Recall that
u and v capture the uncertainty of the election at each level of government. When
v increases, the reelection prospects of the federal incumbent become more uncertain.
Ceteris paribus, this reduces the incumbents incentive to spend on the public good. The
same is true at the subcentral level. However, in what follows, because of a lack of
electoral data at the subcentral level we will assume that while v varies within country
over time, u does not.
For the purpose of our empirical analysis we assembled a new database combining informa-
tion from four sources: the IMFs Government Financial Statistics (GFS); the World Banks
Dataset of Political Indicators (DPI) and World Development Indicators (WDI); and the Polity
2 dataset from the University of Maryland. Country data is at the annual level. We dispose of
an unbalanced panel of a total of 107 countries for the period 1990 to 2006.11
From GFS we included data on expenditures and revenues of di¤erent levels of government
(central, state and local). We have used this information to construct our measures of central-
ization (or decentralization). DPI contains information on the political system of each country
as well as a vast array of electoral variables, such as party composition and strength of national
governments and oppositions. We used this information for our measures of political strength.
The WDI dataset gives variables concerning overall economic indicators and constitutes our
basis for additional control variables. Finally, the primary use of Polity 2 is to restrict our
sample to democracies.
Our dependent variables correspond to centralization ratios:
CENTRAL =
gc
gc + gs + gl
; (20)
where g is government expenditure (or revenues); c is central government; s is state or sub-
federal government; and l is local government. Thus, we contrast central government decisions
with decisions taken at any sub-central unit. Data is taken from the GFS-Series 2 Cash expen-
diturefor central, state and local governments.12 We exclude observations with centralization
11Not all countries present data for all years. A total of 104 countries present at least one year of central
government expenditure. The countries formed out of Yugoslavia are considered individually in our dataset.
Note that our dataset includes all the countries of Panizza (1999) except: Central African Republic, Guatemala,
Honduras, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, New Zealand, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Yemen and Zaire.
12We computed overall public expenditure as indicated in (20). GFS contains the government unit General
Government, which, in principle should correspond to the denominator of (20). However, information on this
variable is lacking in many instances, and hence we did not use it. Additionally, we have run our regressions
ratios equal to one, since we are unable to distinguish between absence of sub-central spending
and missing data.13
The political variables that we include in our analysis intend to capture the absolute
strength of the government, the relative strength vis-à-vis the opposition and the dispersion
of opposition political forces. To capture government strength (GOVSTREN), we use ve
political variables:
 Central Government Seat Share (MAJ): Share of seats held by the government.14
 Central Government Vote Share (NUMV OTE): Share of votes held by the govern-
ment. Depending on the electoral system (e.g. the rst-past-the-post system in Canada)
NUMV OTE can be di¤erent from the seat distribution (MAJ).
 Central Government Seat Advantage (SEATADV ): The di¤erence between legis-
lature seats held by government (NUMGOV ) and by opposition (NUMOPP ) as a ratio
of total seats. Total seats is dened as the sum of government, opposition and unaligned
(NUMUL) seats. Note that seat advantage can be negative.
 Central Government Herndahl Index (HERFGOV ): Sum of squared seat shares
of government parties.
 Central Opposition Herndahl Index (HERFOPP ): Sum of squared seat shares
of opposition parties.
Seat share and vote share of the government represent the absolute political strength of
the government; seat advantage captures the relative strength of the government compared to
using the Series 7 Outlays. Results do not vary signicantly and are available upon request.
13 Inspection of the data showed that the expenditure centralization ratio in Romania for 1990 was less than
1%. We dropped this observation as well.
14Government parties are dened within the DPI.
its opposition; government Herndahl Index (HHI) is an indication of the political spectrum
that is combined within the government parties, a government is likely to be weaker if it has
to rely on coalitions with a large number of parties holding di¤erent views. Finally, opposition
HHI is an indicator of the political dispersion of opposition parties. A high HHI is an indicator
of a fragmented opposition, hence potentially more leeway for the government. All political
variables are taken directly from DPI, except central government seat advantage which we
constructed.15 Additionally, we include in all our regressions the logs of GDP per capita, pop-
ulation and population density, all taken from WDI. They form the X vector in the regression
equation (below).
Figure 1 presents a scatterplot of the centralization ratio and the central government vote
share for the year 1992. We observe a slightly positive raw correlation, indicating that higher
political strength seems to favour higher centralization ratios, consistent with the theoretical
models prediction. Table 1 presents summary statistics of our dataset.
In order to move beyond such unconditional correlations, regression results follow in the
next section.
5 Estimation and Results
We implement the following linear version of equation (19):
CENTRALjt = + GOVSTRENjt + Xjt +COUNTRYj +YEARt + "jt; (21)
15We excluded observations where government vote share was equal to zero (NUMV OTE = 0). Note that
the number of observations with missing values varies across the di¤erent political variables, which implies that
the sample varies across specications.
where COUNTRYj is a vector of country xed e¤ects, and YEARt is a vector of year e¤ects.
We ran panel data least squares regressions including country xed e¤ects and year e¤ects in
all our specications. A constant is always included, though unreported.
5.1 Base Regressions
Table 2 presents our baseline expenditure specications. We present results using the seat
share, vote share and seat advantage variables in turn, while we include, besides the additional
controls, the opposition HHI in all specications. Further, some specications allow for possibly
non-linear e¤ects including squares and cubes of the government strength variables.16 Standard
errors are robust.
Our sample contains between 453 and 530 observations, from 59 to 64 countries. The dif-
ferent specications explain between 18% and 46% of total variation, and the economic control
variables are all highly signicant and in line with expectations. Higher income and higher
population density increase expenditure centralization, while a larger population decreases it.
A rst important result is that in all our specications the political variables included are
jointly highly signicant, as illustrated by the Wald-test statistic in the last two rows of the
table.17 Columns (1) to (3) of Table 2 present the results using seat share (MAJ) to represent
the political strength of the government. In a linear specication, column (1) suggests that a
higher seat share leads to less centralization (more decentralization). The negative coe¢ cient
on the MAJ variable thus appears to contradict the raw correlation of Figure 1. However,
columns (2) and (3) suggest that this relationship is likely to be non-linear. Including the
square of MAJ reveals the expected positive linear term, with a negative square term (both
16 In support for the latter functional forms, note the nonlinear form of equation (18). We come back to the
nonlinearity issue in our discussion of the results below.
17 In this subsection, inference is based on robust standard errors. See the next subsection for a discussion of
clustering issues.
are statistically signicant). Finally, we obtain the best results statistically when we also
include a cubic term of MAJ , where all coe¢ cients are signicant at the 1% level. Again,
signs of the coe¢ cients switch, this time with a negative linear, positive square and negative
cubic term. We nd similar results using the government vote share (columns (4) to (6)).
Using seat advantage to measure relative political strength (columns (7) to (9)) seems to
stand on slightly weaker statistical grounds. Only the squared term is signicant (at the 5%
level) if allowing for linear and square terms, while only the square and cubic ones are signicant
if allowing for all three terms. Finally, in column (10) we include the government HHI as a
political variable but do not nd any signicant e¤ect. The opposition HHI is included in all ten
specications, and is negative and signicant in three of them. Hence, a stronger opposition (as
measured by a larger concentration index) tends to imply lower levels of centralization. This is
in line with the theorys prediction that a weak central government should be associated with
more decentralization.
Table 3 presents the same specications using revenue centralization as the dependent
variable. As for the expenditure regressions, the political variables are jointly signicant in all
specications. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient on the opposition HHI is now highly signicantly
negative in all specications. The estimated patterns for the government strength variables
are similar to those estimated in expenditure specications, again highlighting the nonlinear
nature of the relationship.
5.2 Robustness Checks
As a robustness check we present, in Table 4, the results of our most exible specications
(using cubic terms) with clustered standard errors at the country level. Indeed, as shown
by Stock and Watson (2008), the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors following White
(1980), commonly used, may be signicantly biased in a panel context. They suggest, among
other, the use of clustered standard errors, where the clusters are applied at the dimension of
the xed e¤ect.18 The results of Stock and Watson (2008) depend on xed T and it has been
reported that the clustering method might be unstable in situations of unbalanced panels (see
Nichols and Scha¤er, 2007).
As expected, our results with clustered standard errors are slightly more conservative. Nev-
ertheless, the included political variables are jointly signicant at the 5% level in all regressions.
Individual coe¢ cients for seat shares (MAJ), both for expenditures and revenues and govern-
ment vote share (NUMV OTE), only for expenditures are still signicant at conventional
levels.
5.3 Discussion of Results
What do our results imply? Our main result is that political variables are important determi-
nants of the degree of centralization. However, all of our empirical results do not necessarily
conrm our priors. On the one hand, results based on the opposition Herndhal index suggest
that a strong central government tends to be associated with more centralization. But on the
other hand, looking at Table 1 we observe that in the linear specication (column (1)) political
strength of the federal government, measured by the government seat share, has a negative
impact on the degree of centralization. Hence, our proxy of lower (federal) reelection uncer-
tainty fails to predict an increase in the contribution to the federal public good. This result
is robust when we allow for the most exible parameterization. Figure 2 presents the e¤ect
of government seat share in the cubic specication on the degree of centralization, showing a
18 Indeed, as of Version 10, Stata automatically presents the clustered standard errors when using the option
robust.
consistently signicant negative impact, at least over the range of centralization we observe.19
Figure 2 also nicely illustrates the nonlinearity of the relationship between government
strength and centralization. In particular, there appears to be a di¤erential e¤ect towards
the bounds of the domain (0 and 1). Although corner solutions were intentionally left out of
the theoretical discussion to simplify exposition, nonlinear outcomes are likely to arise in the
model because reelection probabilities are bounded  see equation (14) above. For a given
government, the incentive to spend more to improve reelection prospects disappears when the
reelection probability hits one. A similar issue may arise at the zero bound.
But besides highlighting the nonlinear nature of the relationship, our mixed empirical results
suggest that our simple theoretical model does not fully capture the complexity of government
behaviour. Should a strong government investmore in public good provision when its re-
election prospects are higher? The implicit assumption in our model is yes: when reelection
uncertainty decreases, public spending is a safer investment for the incumbent. This view of
government behaviour is consistent with a theoretical perspective, due to Cox and McCubbins
(1986) and revisited in Joanis (forthcoming), for which the latter nd strong empirical support
in a distributive politics application. However, a competing view of government behaviour, in
the Downsian tradition, predicts that an incumbent should be expected to spend more when
the election is highly uncertain see, for example, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). In our context,
this swing voterview of government incentives would predict an activist central government
when its reelection prospects are uncertain. In line with the discussion in Joanis (forthcoming),
a more complete theoretical model would nest both views of government behaviour, which have
both been shown to be empirically relevant.
19Condence intervals are calculated based on clustered standard errors, consistent with the previous subsec-
tion.
6 Conclusion
All levels of government in a federation (or a decentralized unitarystate) are more or less
involved in similar sectors of activity. In such a context typical in real-world federations 
making coherent collective choices is a complex undertaking for voters, who need to garner
information about the contribution of each level of government to the aggregate policy out-
comes that they observe. To capture such informational complexity, this paper has considered
a political agency model in which the presence of a hierarchy of governments involved in the
provision of a public good creates an externality on the spending side (with respect to the
intergovernmental composition of government spending). In the model, the provision of public
goods by both levels of government in a federation is the margin along which political compe-
tition occurs. In a given subnational jurisdiction, the central and the subnational governments
compete for the support of the same voters (though in separate elections) by each providing
public goods. Under some realistic conditions chiey, imperfectly informed voters and substi-
tutable central and subnational public goods the model predicts that the equilibrium degree
of decentralization will diverge from the social optimum.
Our empirical results lend support to that theoretical perspective. They support the rele-
vance of political factors as determinants of scal decentralization. The empirical application
of this paper has focused on one aspect of the political economy of scal decentralization, that
is the inuence of central government electoral strength. The relationship between the latter
and both expenditure and revenue centralization emerges as nontrivial and nonlinear. Political
forces driving centralization down the linear e¤ect of seat and vote shares and up the e¤ect
of opposition composition appear to coexist (see our discussion in the previous subsection).
The exploratory cross-country analysis presented in this paper can most certainly be im-
proved along many dimensions. Our dataset presents a number of important issues that pre-
clude us from estimating our model the way we wish. First, since we do not observe sub-central
political outcomes, we cannot use information on the relative strength of government. Second,
our data cover general spending only. More precise results might be obtained using specic
spending categories, more in line with our theoretical model. Despite these drawbacks, we
think that our analysis is a useful rst step into assessing the e¤ect of political instances on
the issue of scal decentralization.
But further work is obviously needed to rene those early results. This paper is part of
a broader, ongoing research agenda. In future work, we intend to test the predictions of the
Joanis (2009) theoretical model in a broad set of institutional environments. We are currently
conducting similar empirical studies with a panel of Canadian provinces (Jametti and Joanis,
2009b) and a panel of Swiss cantons, in which it is possible to include subnational elections data
in the analysis. An interesting avenue would be to explicitly include the relative competencies
in the empirical analysis, perhaps using Public Sector E¢ ciency (PSE) measures  see, for
example, Afonso et al. (2005).
Despite these necessary renements, the analysis already has interesting implications for
policy design, highlighting the need for decentralization reforms to take into account the real-
ity of the political process. For example, shared responsibility in policy areas that are politi-
cally sensitive (e.g. infrastructure investment) may be especially conducive to ine¢ cient public
spending. With partial decentralization of expenditure responsibilities being an increasingly
pervasive institution in both developed and developing countries, this paper indicates a need
to shift the policy focus from whether decentralization is desirable to how decentralization is
actually implemented.
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure Centralization 558 0.77 0.14 0.40 0.99
Revenue Centralization 563 0.74 0.15 0.39 0.99
Central government seat share (MAJ) 802 0.60 0.18 0.11 1.00
Central government vote share (NUMVOTE) (in %) 665 50.70 15.77 5.50 100.00
Central government seat advantage (SEATADV) 802 0.21 0.35 ‐0.78 1.00
Central government Herfindahl index (HERFGOV) 798 0.69 0.29 0.01 1.00
Central opposition Herfindahl index (HERFOPP) 742 0.52 0.25 0.07 1.00
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 557 10321.26 10549.92 129.20 38407.11
Population (in millions) 557 52.68 159.29 0.25 1079.72
Population Density 557 115.52 146.77 1.39 1254.06
Sources: GFS, DPI, WDI
Table 1
Summary Statistics
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable = Ratio of Expenditure 
Centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Central government seat share (MAJ) ‐0.04746** 0.22167* ‐1.37754***
0.01993 0.11577 0.37079
MAJ2 ‐0.22106** 2.53209***
0.09884 0.66304
MAJ3 ‐1.48522***
0.37983
Central government vote share (NUMVOTE) ‐0.00072** 0.00246** ‐0.01107***
0.00029 0.00099 0.0023
NUMVOTE2 ‐0.00003*** 0.00023***
0.00001 0.00005
NUMVOTE3 ‐0.00000***
0
Central government seat advantage (SEATADV) ‐0.02412** ‐0.00156 0.01748
0.01013 0.0118 0.01267
SEATADV2 ‐0.05198** 0.07102**
0.0241 0.02894
SEATADV3 ‐0.17382***
0.04688
Central government Herfindahl index (HERFGOV) 0.01193
0.00949
Central opposition Herfindahl index (HERFOPP) ‐0.02011* ‐0.01943 ‐0.02261* ‐0.00126 ‐0.00719 ‐0.01063 ‐0.01939 ‐0.0198 ‐0.02234* ‐0.01119
0.0118 0.01203 0.01217 0.0129 0.01274 0.01218 0.01183 0.01204 0.01229 0.01261
Log(GDP per capita) 0.08126*** 0.06926*** 0.05926*** 0.03003 0.02748 0.01367 0.08038*** 0.07041*** 0.05937*** 0.07950***
0.02304 0.02252 0.02218 0.02607 0.02613 0.02459 0.02287 0.02248 0.0222 0.02351
Log(Population) ‐2.06490*** ‐2.02158*** ‐1.58090** ‐1.96732*** ‐1.76227*** ‐1.56251** ‐2.08411*** ‐2.00165*** ‐1.65759*** ‐2.11261***
0.56895 0.54829 0.64241 0.56337 0.54712 0.66951 0.57056 0.55072 0.63926 0.60064
Log(Population Density) 1.92334*** 1.88509*** 1.43940** 1.57536*** 1.41742** 1.23732* 1.94346*** 1.86372*** 1.51807** 1.97726***
0.57492 0.55551 0.64868 0.57456 0.56043 0.68107 0.57658 0.55819 0.64581 0.60349
Log likelihood 1220.97259 1227.62659 1242.7616 1083.24288 1095.45998 1117.46761 1221.08118 1227.16828 1240.25974 1217.79318
R‐squared 0.1957 0.21564 0.25918 0.37731 0.41 0.46463 0.19602 0.21428 0.25215 0.17739
Number of Observations 530 530 530 453 453 453 530 530 530 531
Number of Countries 64 64 64 59 59 59 64 64 64 64
Joint Significance of Political Variables 5.68 4.53 5.27 3.42 4.04 8.51 5.72 4.47 5.07 2.51
P‐value 0.0037 0.0039 0.0004 0.0339 0.0075 0.0000 0.0035 0.0042 0.0005 0.0827
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: A constant, time effects and country fixed effects included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in italics.
Table 2
Base Regressions ‐ Expenditure Centralization
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable = Ratio of Revenue 
Centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Central government seat share (MAJ) ‐0.02863 0.20789* ‐1.00224***
0.02017 0.12239 0.37099
MAJ2 ‐0.19421* 1.88978***
0.10217 0.66904
MAJ3 ‐1.12441***
0.38362
Central government vote share (NUMVOTE) ‐0.0005 0.00354*** ‐0.00777***
0.00031 0.00101 0.00289
NUMVOTE2 ‐0.00004*** 0.00018***
0.00001 0.00006
NUMVOTE3 ‐0.00000***
0
Central government seat advantage (SEATADV) ‐0.01359 0.00722 0.02187
0.01028 0.01364 0.01473
SEATADV2 ‐0.04787* 0.0459
0.02532 0.03125
SEATADV3 ‐0.13263***
0.04885
Central government Herfindahl index (HERFGOV) 0.01245
0.00974
Central opposition Herfindahl index (HERFOPP) ‐0.04049*** ‐0.03989*** ‐0.04234*** ‐0.04682*** ‐0.05452*** ‐0.05746*** ‐0.03999*** ‐0.04038*** ‐0.04236*** ‐0.03151**
0.01429 0.0145 0.01481 0.01448 0.01412 0.01381 0.01433 0.01461 0.01492 0.01483
Log(GDP per capita) 0.09487*** 0.08429*** 0.07664*** 0.07215** 0.06895** 0.05733** 0.09429*** 0.08507*** 0.07659*** 0.09368***
0.02939 0.02905 0.02862 0.02822 0.0271 0.02554 0.02928 0.02895 0.0286 0.02898
Log(Population) ‐2.37052*** ‐2.33108*** ‐1.99474*** ‐2.20797*** ‐1.94450*** ‐1.77461** ‐2.37175*** ‐2.29443*** ‐2.02940*** ‐2.53083***
0.68071 0.64173 0.73664 0.68564 0.64263 0.79306 0.68353 0.64823 0.7347 0.6759
Log(Population Density) 2.12339*** 2.08855*** 1.74880** 1.79809** 1.59531** 1.44229* 2.12519*** 2.05052*** 1.78466** 2.29009***
0.69142 0.65368 0.74631 0.69513 0.65428 0.80118 0.69419 0.66012 0.74445 0.68376
Log likelihood 1178.64569 1183.23179 1190.82406 1036.14818 1053.34367 1066.70412 1178.39436 1183.00436 1189.69424 1179.67722
R‐squared 0.22971 0.24308 0.2647 0.3416 0.39036 0.42573 0.22897 0.24242 0.26152 0.22481
Number of Observations 524 524 524 447 447 447 524 524 524 525
Number of Countries 64 64 64 59 59 59 64 64 64 64
Joint Significance of Political Variables 6.14 4.46 4.06 8.05 9.35 9.77 6.03 4.36 3.87 6.43
P‐value 0.0023 0.0042 0.0031 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0048 0.0042 0.0018
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: A constant, time effects and country fixed effects included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in italics.
Table 3
Base Regressions ‐ Revenue Centralization
 
 
 
Dependent Variable = 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Central government seat share (MAJ) ‐1.37754** ‐1.00224*
0.57166 0.58724
MAJ2 2.53209** 1.88978*
1.05293 1.10442
MAJ3 ‐1.48522** ‐1.12441*
0.6239 0.66003
Central government vote share (NUMVOTE) ‐0.01107*** ‐0.00777**
0.00254 0.00374
NUMVOTE2 0.00023*** 0.00018**
0.00005 0.00007
NUMVOTE3 ‐0.00000*** ‐0.00000***
0.00000 0.00000
Central government seat advantage (SEATADV) 0.01748 0.02187
0.02058 0.02182
SEATADV2 0.07102 0.0459
0.0431 0.04496
SEATADV3 ‐0.17382** ‐0.13263
0.07668 0.08381
Central opposition Herfindahl index (HERFOPP) ‐0.02261 ‐0.01063 ‐0.02234 ‐0.04234** ‐0.05746*** ‐0.04236**
0.01453 0.0141 0.01477 0.01884 0.01716 0.01862
Log(GDP per capita) 0.05926* 0.01367 0.05937* 0.07664** 0.05733 0.07659**
0.03228 0.03589 0.03218 0.03656 0.0379 0.03619
Log(Population) ‐1.58090*** ‐1.56251*** ‐1.65759*** ‐1.99474*** ‐1.77461*** ‐2.02940***
0.51506 0.53258 0.52382 0.63777 0.51291 0.62448
Log(Population Density) 1.43940** 1.23732** 1.51807** 1.74880** 1.44229** 1.78466***
0.57144 0.57372 0.57875 0.68444 0.56615 0.67056
Log likelihood 1242.76 1117.47 1240.26 1190.82 1066.70 1189.69
R‐squared 0.26 0.46 0.25 0.26 0.43 0.26
Number of Observations 530 453 530 524 447 524
Number of Countries 64 59 64 64 59 64
Joint Significance of Political Variables 2.60 19.45 2.68 1.87 10.46 1.84
P‐value 0.0447 0.0000 0.0397 0.1268 0.0000 0.1318
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: A constant, time effects and country fixed effects included in all regressions. Clustered (by country) standard errors in italics.
Expenditure Centralization Revenue Centralization
Table 4
Robustness Checks
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